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1. Introduction 
 
Money laundering is a threat to the good functioning of a financial system; 
however, it can also be the weak point of criminal activity and an indicator for 
corruption.  The existence of a framework with high legal, professional and ethical 
standards is essential for the integrity of a national financial services marketplace.1 As 
the emerging information society services offer new dimensions to the money 
laundering practices, international co-operation is defined as crucial in order for 
measures to bring results. Southeastern Europe is a region where most of the countries 
are associated with the European Union, but only two of them, Greece and Turkey, 
are members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering; 
although none of the rest is among the non-cooperative countries or territories listed 
in FATF’s review. 
Taking into account the fact that the region has suffered a long period of 
disorders and that developing economies are expected not to be able to afford being 
too selective about the sources of capital they attract, the paper will attempt to identify 
the possibilities and risks of infringements of the FATF recommendations as a result 
of new technologies activity. 
Undoubtedly, the impact of recent legal developments in the European Union, 
should be also considered, as - apart from the membership of Greece - Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey have already signed association 
agreements and have submitted accession applications. The European Union 
institutions have recently proceeded to a new E-commerce Directive, combined with 
five proposed directives intending to shape the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, in the view of guaranteeing that free 
movement of information society services within the Single Market will be a reality 
the sooner possible. 
To what extent do these legislative reforms cover money laundering issues, 
occurring from the electronic activities of international business companies, or 
offshore front companies of international firms? Would the Southeastern European 
countries jurisdictions offer an alternative to money laundering activities? Are the 
                                                
1 Financial Action Task Force (FATF/OECD), <http://www.oecd.org/fatf>. 
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latter ready to implement the international and EU requirements concerning the 
protection from new technology money laundering practices? 
 
 
2. Information Society Services and Cyber crime 
 
A lot of noise is being made about the new economy, the development of 
information society, about introducing the Internet to more households worldwide, to 
reach more hits, page views, user sessions, banner clicks, list members, registered 
users in on-line clubs, user accounts for web services. Most of the times, for an on-
line service provider, whether this is the web site of a brand simply aiming at 
interactivity with the public or an electronic store, requirements for personal data are 
viewed as repulsive for prospective users or customers. From a different perspective, 
some users view the extensive personal data fields in an on-line registration form as a 
guarantee for the quality of the service they apply for. In any case, a large number of 
Internet users when applying for on-line services usually give false personal 
information, accompanied by an existing web-mail2, which nevertheless has been 
acquired using false or insufficient for identification data. It would be wrong though, 
to assume that nine out of ten people in our society have underlying criminal 
intentions. The simplest explanation is that when one is given the possibility of 
keeping his or her anonymity, he or she will do it, because “anonymity is of 
incontestable value in protecting privacy” and “[a]lmost everyone has a reason to 
speak or act anonymously at some point”.3 
Cyber crime and consequently cyber laundering, certainly ignores the anxiety 
of making the information society a new channel for media and commercial services 
and focuses on what possibilities one is given by these new technologies. In reality 
there is a delicate balance between possibilities requiring special skills by the user 
who can take advantage of the inefficiencies of the systems – (hacking) - and 
possibilities of facilitation between experts that became far-fetched paid services and 
then free services in the name of marketing and publicity goals – (exploitation of new 
                                                
2 E-mail address provided by a web-site, maintaining a personal mailbox for each e-mail account in its 
web servers, managed remotely by the user, with certain limitations in space availability as opposed to 
an e-mail account opened by an Internet Service Provider giving to the user the possibility to manage 
and store the mailbox in his or her personal computer. 
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means for coverage or diffusion of evidence). To continue with, the quest for “more” 
in the Internet world results to the offering of services that used to be “tricks for 
freaks” for free.4 This trend gives way to a new generation of criminals to be, 
fascinated by the anonymity and the capability of worldwide communication at these 
low costs and most importantly in an economy that in a large part of the world can be 
still controlled by the skills of a programmer as opposed to the money of a 
businessman. 
Finally, it seems that as far as the use of internet technologies is concerned, the 
world is advancing at almost the same pace; while on the contrary the commercial, 
advertising and marketing side of the information society requires for conventional 
businesses to adjust to the new conditions and follows the rhythms of economic 
development, obviously varying from region to region. This is why South Eastern 
Europe may be a region under development, with major economic problems, but still 
makes no exception to the rule. 
 
 
3. Money Laundering and Cyber Laundering 
 
For the purposes of the anti-money laundering EC Directive5 money 
laundering is defined as “the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such 
activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or 
of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade 
the legal consequences of his action”. The above conduct has to be committed 
intentionally, while the EC Directive is specifically detailed, making sure that every 
aspect of the issue is covered. Thus, according to the same article, money laundering 
is also the “acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt 
that such property is derived from criminal activity (…)”. Considering a more generic 
                                                                                                                                       
3 Reitinger P.R., “Encryption, Anonymity and Markets”, Cybercrime, Law enforcement, security and 
surveillance in the information age, Ed. Thomas, D. – Loader, B.D., Routledge 2000, p. 136. 
4 Example of redirecting user URLs to sub web URLs (more commercial names) for free. Until 
recently, in order to have a URL that the user could remember, meaning that it wouldn’t need the entire 
address bar, one had to pay. 
5 Article 1, Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering. 
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definition6 “[m]oney laundering is a legal catch phrase that refers to the criminal 
practice of taking ill-gotten gains and moving them through a sequence of bank 
accounts so they ultimately look like legitimate profits from legal business. The 
money is then withdrawn and used for further criminal activity.”  
The last observation is incorrect though. Anti-money laundering regulations 
do not seek to examine the ultimate use of laundered money, most probably because it 
goes without saying that the property of a criminal is used back in criminal activities. 
The Bulgarian law gives a slightly different aspect; money laundering concerns 
illegally gained “cash or other property, and the yield thereof (…) [which] is being 
introduced into the economic cycle and the result of its use is recorded by 
bookkeeping and taxed”.7 What is more than certain is that, at the end of the day, 
laundered money is being taxed and governments will not find an incentive there for 
combating the phenomenon. The latter is not so certain with the Internet, because it is 
harder to “pinpoint the identity or location of people who are carrying out potentially 
taxable activities”8. From a different point of view, “[t]he war against money 
laundering is really a second front in the failed war against drugs.”9, merely started by 
the United States. Moreover, the preamble of the above mentioned EC Directive 
acknowledges: “combating money laundering is one of the most effective means of 
opposing [organized crime in general and drug trafficking in particular]”.10 
 Money laundering is said to be “a process, often a highly complex one, rather 
than a single act”11. This process includes the “placement”, “layering” and 
“integration” stages12, the first being “probably the point of greatest vulnerability for 
the launderer”13. After the proceeds have been placed in a financial institution or used 
to purchase an asset, the “layering” stage comes to conceal or disguise the source of 
the ownership of the funds by making sure that the authorities will be confused in 
                                                
6 Definition found in New York Times by Rob Norton, September 1999, “In Defence of Money 
Laundering”, Fortune. 
7 Republic of Bulgaria, Measures Against Money Laundering Act, [No. 85/24-07-1998]. 
8 The Economist, 27-1-2000, Survey: Globalisation and Tax, “Net losses: Why the taxman fears the 
Internet”. 
9 Norton, R., 1999, n 6 above. 
10 Directive 91/308/EEC, n 5 above. Further analysis of this discussion below, (5. South Eastern 
Europe: An alternative?). 
11 Gilmore W., 1995, “Dirty Money”, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, p. 37. 
12 It has become common to utilise a three-part framework that seeks to encompass an ideal money 
laundering scheme. (Gilmore W., 1995, n 11 above, p. 37). 
13 Snaith I., 2000, “Money Laundering, Financial Services and the European Union: Ever Expanding 
Regulation?”, unpublished, p.2. 
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case of trying to trace them. The third stage consists of the apparent legalization of the 
funds. 
Relating the above considerations, particularly the second stage, to the role of 
information society services, one can easily imagine that the less launderers are 
physically seen in a financial institution, the better they manage to increase the 
complexity of the process and make it even more untraceable. Managing multiple 
bank accounts through on-line banking services14, can be easily done from a single 
person from any location. In describing the impact of on-line banking on money 
laundering FATF experts make a similar observation. “[A]n individual desiring to 
conceal his or her true identity (…) would be able to have unrestricted on-line access 
to and control of his bank accounts in any location.”15 In any case, on-line fund 
transferring comes to add a medium, giving to launderers greater chances for 
diffusion.  
On balance, one could support, new forms of communicating and transacting 
are just a means, which can be used appropriately by both sides. Accomplices need to 
trust each other. With electronic transactions one can never know who is “at the other 
end” of the telecommunications network. On the contrary, “[t]otal anonymity affords 
criminals the ability to launder money and engage in other illegal activity in ways that 
circumvent law enforcement.” 16 Combined with encryption or steganography17 and 
anonymous remailers18, electronic cash19 becomes a very powerful medium. 
Moreover, money laundering measures regulate corporations licensed by national 
authorities and since the Internet can be (easily and at low costs) used for unofficial 
corporate activity and service providing by solely web businesses the enforcement 
and monitoring part of an anti-money laundering policy, becomes extremely difficult 
if not impossible. 
                                                
14 On-line banking includes accessing financial services indirectly, that is by telephone, automatic teller 
machines (ATM) and the Internet (FATF-XI, 3-2-2000, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 
1999-2000, FATF/OECD). Yet, the present paper will focus on banking and non-banking Internet 
services which appear to be the newest area of money laundering typologies. 
15 FATF-XI, 2000, n 14 above, p.2. 
16 Denning, D.E. – Baugh, W.E., Jr, 2000, “Hiding crimes in cyberspace”, Cybercrime, Law 
enforcement, security and surveillance in the information age, Ed. Thomas, D. – Loader, B.D., 
Routledge, p. 126. 
17 Methods of hiding secret data in other data such that their existence is even concealed. Encoding the 
secret data in the low-order bit positions of image, sound or video files is one of the methods used 
(Denning, D.E. – Baugh, W.E., Jr,, 2000 n. 16 above, p. 122). 
18 “A service that allows someone to send an electronic mail message without the receiver knowing the 
sender’s identity.” (Denning, D.E. – Baugh, W.E., Jr,, 2000 n. 16 above, p. 125). 
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3 a. Practices and relations 
 
Internet services can well be used as a cover or as a means for money 
laundering purposes. It depends on which side the launderer is found. Three main 
categories of criminal activity can therefore be described through commonly 
conceivable at the moment web practices. 
The first case would be that of the web service provider not being aware of the 
money launderer’s activities, who takes advantage of the new technologies and above 
all the anonymity or relative anonymity offered, in order to launder the proceeds. 
Relative anonymity can be defined as the advantage of losing anonymity only upon 
suspicion.20 To be more specific, the personal data of a customer being known, the 
web service provider has no reason or sometimes possibility to distinguish him from 
the whole of its customers or specially observe his activities. Therefore, such a 
situation could be referring to the e-banking service of a well-known bank, whose 
account opening procedure and monitoring software are proven unable to detect the 
suspicious movements. There is no doubt that a bank or non-bank financial institution 
could very well belong to the second category analyzed below, letting the money 
launderers act under its tolerance. At this point, provided that relative legislation 
exists, the role of the state authorities is considered crucial in order to enforce an anti-
money laundering policy, as legally registered corporations are the first to be 
regulated and monitored.21 
 In the second case, the web business is an accomplice in the money laundering 
procedure and as the persons involved possibly co-operate by other means, the 
conventional methods of tracing criminals may be useful for authorities. In this 
category the first to be blamed is the on-line gambling business. Opening an account 
and maintaining a “wallet” in an on-line casino or bookmaker is subject to less 
identification requirements than opening an account with a bank, but this does not 
necessarily imply that the web site is involved or aware of the criminal origin of the 
funds put in its member accounts. The obvious reason for the involvement of the 
                                                                                                                                       
19 Transactions using electronic currencies such as E-cash, <http://www.digicash.com> or E-gold, 
<http://www.e-gold.com>. 
20 As Mark Bortner mentions “[t]he trick was, and still is, to avoid attracting unwanted attention”, 
1996, “Cyberlaundering: Anonymous Digital Cash and Money Laundering”, University of Miami, 
School of Law. 
21 Existing regulation primarily focuses on measures to be taken by financial institutions. (FATF Forty 
Recommendations, 1996, FATF/OECD and EC Directive 91/308/EEC, n 5 above) 
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operator of the apparently legal activity is that laundering of the funds is not 
guaranteed, unless the “customer” is “lucky enough” to win back the money minus 
the percentage agreed, that would be the profit for the front-end business. On the other 
hand, one would argue that suspicion by the authorities is most possible as an on-line 
business willing to take the risk of offering money laundering services might not even 
be legally established. The apparently “unsuspicious customer” who is the initial 
provider of the illegal funds can still avoid liability, based on the falsified or 
insufficient identification data he provided during his registration. Given the 
opportunity of using the particular example, we may add that according to a well-
respected member of the Greek gaming industry, “the money is where consumption 
is” and “for an online lottery or wagering business money laundering, as an additional 
source of income, is not worth the risk”. With no doubt this is the case of a business 
with a satisfying market share, operating in a highly regulated system. 
 Furthermore, taking into consideration the above possible scenarios, hacking 
is not found necessary or at least indispensable. In the former case the money 
launderer presents himself as a regular customer, while in the latter the parties have 
already connived. Consequently, hacking has place only where the money launderer 
and the apparently legal “laundry” are not collaborating, in the occasion that 
anonymity must be guaranteed by electronic counterfeiting; the goal being not to 
extract but to put money into legal accounts. 
 A third service, exclusively electronic, developed thanks to the differences in 
jurisdictions around the world and above all intending to “exploit variations in 
national laws”22 without having any legal consequences, is that of web sites offering 
investment opportunities. This third scenario contains some of the indisputable 
legality of a financial institution, not breaking any legal provision and some of the 
tolerance of an accomplice. It would be too optimistic to deny that another service, 
digital currency, does not comply with the above characteristics23, as most 
applications work under the concept that “it is impossible for anyone to link payment 
                                                
22 Taggart, St., “Dotcoms desperately seeking sovereignty”, The Industry Standard – Europe, 23 Nov. 
2000, p.74.  
23 Although, with most applications the customer has to “load” his wallet with electronic cash through 
an existing bank account, his transactions from that point further remain anonymous. For example E-
cash <http://www.digicash.com>. 
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to payer, but users can prove unequivocally that they did or did not make a particular 
payment, without revealing anything more”.24 
 
3 b. The problem of location 
 
 National legislation on money laundering usually imposes obligations to the 
financial institutions and in some occasions to other professionals25, under the concept 
that the customers are found and transactions are taking place in their territory. In the 
case of on-line banking the financial institutions open a world wide web - therefore 
transnational – branch, but normally offer their services provided that the customer 
supplies a local address and other identification data26. On the other hand, customers 
are not necessarily found within the territory where the financial institution is legally 
registered and/or provides conventional services. The transaction could be taking 
place in the server, in the institution’s site of incorporation or head office location or 
in the client’s personal computer, depending the legislation, if any.27 
 To continue with, the parties of an information society transaction are the 
client and the service provider, while the web server where the on-line content is 
being hosted realizes the electronic contract, agreement, exchange, order. The web 
server could be physically in a different location than the business providing the 
service and the actual head office of the business could be in a different location than 
the place it has been incorporated. 
 
 
4. The current legislative framework - Participation of South Eastern 
European countries to collective anti-money laundering efforts28 
 
4 a. FATF Members 
 
 The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is an inter-
governmental body under the auspices of OECD, which develops and promotes 
                                                
24 Bortner, M., 1996, n 20 above. 
25 View below: 4 a) FATF Members and 4 c) EU Members. 
26 An on-line registration is almost always required. The level of details required through compulsory 
fields depends on the legislative provisions imposed to each institution. 
27 Lloyd, I.J., 2000, Information Technology Law, Butterworths, p. 553 and 593. 
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policies, both nationally and internationally, to combat money laundering. Its primary 
goal is to generate the political will for national legislative and regulatory reforms, 
needed for combating economic crime of this type. From the countries under 
discussion, only Greece and Turkey are members of the FATF. 29 
The main obligations deriving from this membership is the ratification and full 
implementation of the 1998 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances as well as the implementation of the Forty FATF 
Recommendations.30 More specifically, regarding the new technologies, participating 
countries are urged to “pay special attention to money laundering threats inherent in 
new or developing technologies that might favour anonymity” and if needed “take 
measures to prevent their use in money laundering schemes”.31 
In their latest Report on Money Laundering Typologies (1999-2000)32, FATF 
experts consider on-line banking as one of the major money laundering issues. In 
reports of previous years new payment technologies are also analyzed.33 The forty 
recommendations currently reserve a special role for the financial system in order to 
combat money laundering34. Concerning banks and non-bank financial institutions of 
all kinds35, they set customer identification and record-keeping rules36; ensure the 
increased diligence37 of financial institutions by exempting the institutions, their 
directors, officers and employees from any criminal or civil liability if they report 
their suspicions in good faith38; imply measures to avoid money laundering and 
especially for transactions with countries with no or insufficient anti-money 
laundering policies39. 
                                                                                                                                       
28 ANNEX. 
29 The organization’s membership includes twenty- nine countries in total covering Europe, North and 
South America and Asia as well as the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council. 
FATF web site, “More on the FATF and the focus of its current work”, <http://www.oecd.org/fatf>. 
30 Recommendations 1 and 2, n 21 above. 
31 Recommendation 13, n 21 above. 
32 FATF-XI, 2000, n 14 above, as a result of the FATF-XI meeting of experts, Washington, DC, 18-19 
November 1999. 
33 FATF-X, 11-2-1999, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1998-1999, FATF/OECD, after the 
group of experts meeting in London, 17-18 November 1998 and FATF-IX 12-2-1998, Report on 
Money Laundering Typologies 1997-1998, FATF/OECD after the Paris meeting on 19-20 November 
1997. 
34 Recommendations 8-29, n 21 above. 
35 Recommendation 8, n 21 above. 
36 Recommendations 10-13, n 21 above. 
37 Recommendations 14-19, n 21 above. 
38 Recommendation 16, n 21 above. 
39 Recommendations 20-25, n 21 above. 
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FATF recommendations focus on the criminal and not the financial institution 
through which the money is laundered; but contradiction remains: “would you feel 
comfortable if you could be prosecuted for failing to immediately inform the police of 
your suspicions?”40 One could claim that if a financial institution can prove that 
nothing came under its suspicion, then it is not liable. Still, legal departments of banks 
usually have other obligations to fulfill. In the case where it is proved that the illegal 
funds pass through a financial institution there is actual liability of either the 
enterprise or its employees or both. In the interpretative notes for Recommendations 8 
and 9, where the details for “bureaux de change” are presented, as differing from 
banks, the main consequence in case of non-compliance with anti- money laundering 
national law, is fail to obtain a license of operation.41 Of course constant and effective 
control is difficult in such small units as “bureaux the change” are and especially in 
case they provide on-line services, let alone that this kind of national law enforcement 
has chances of happening only in Greece and Turkey. 
 
4 b. Council of Europe / PC-R-EV Committee Members 
 
The Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV Committee) is a sub-committee of the 
European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) and its main task is the mutual 
evaluation reporting of its member states, carried through by the national experts 
appointed to it. 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Romania, Slovenia are members of the PC-R-EV Committee, while Greece and 
Turkey participate as observers, due to their FATF membership. Additionally, a 
number of international and regional organizations, amongst which the European 
Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
                                                
40 Norton R. , 1999, n 6 above. 
41 “(…) Bureaux de change would have to notify their existence to a designated authority but would not 
need to be authorised before they could start business. It would be open to the authority to apply a “fit 
and proper” test to the management of bureaux de change after the bureau had commenced activity, 
and to prohibit the bureau de change from continuing its business, if appropriate. (…)”, Necessary 
Counter-Measures Applicable to Bureaux de Change, Recommendations 8 and 9, Interpretative Notes, 
n 21 above. 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Secretary General of the Council of the 
EU, are observers to the Committee.42 
The work of the PC-R-EV Committee is thus a way of evaluating the existing 
money laundering conditions in European countries that are not FATF members, 
based on the compliance with the FATF forty recommendations, the Vienna 
Convention43, the 91/308/EEC Directive and the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime44. As it will 
be further analyzed below, although the majority of the countries of South-Eastern 
Europe have signed the Vienna and Council of Europe conventions, national 
legislations have very recently proceeded to anti-money laundering measures, a fact 
that makes effectiveness quite impossible at the present time. 
 
4 c. EU Members 
 
 The “Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use 
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering”45 mainly sets the 
European Union’s legal framework against money laundering. The 1999 Commission 
proposal for amendment of the above directive aims to “continue to strengthen the 
Single Market’s defenses against organized crime”46, by introducing regulative 
answers to new trends and extending the scope of the provisions to non financial 
sectors. “[A]s the money laundering defenses of the banking sector have become 
stronger money launderers have sought alternative ways”47 and this is “the most 
noticeable trend” in money laundering techniques, according to FATF’s 1996-97 
Typologies Report. It goes without saying, that the on-line versions of these 
alternative professional businesses, such as “estate agents, arte dealers, auctioneers, 
                                                
42 “Council of Europe PC-R-EV Committee”, FATF web site, <http://www.oecd.org/fatf/ctry-
orgpages/org-pcrev_en.htm>. 
43 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
Vienna, 20 December 1988. 
44 Adopted in Strasbourg on 8 November 1990. 
45 Doc. 391L0308, n 5 above. 
46 Declaration by Financial Services Commissioner Mario Monti, referring to the Commission proposal 
to extend the scope of the 91/308/EEC Directive (n. 4 above), Europa web site, <http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/ internal_market/en/finances/general/99-498.htm>. 
47 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council 
Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering. [Doc. 599PC0352]. 
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casinos, bureaux de change, transporters of funds, notaries, advocates, tax advisors 
and auditors”48 might be already used for money laundering purposes. 
Measures that would directly interest the money laundering via electronic 
means discussion are remarkably comprised in an annex that will be added to the 
amended Directive. The proposed annex49 specifies appropriate methods for credit 
and financial institutions to identify their customers in non face-to-face financial 
operations. To be more specific, concerning the opening of a new account, special 
attention is intended to be paid to the verification of the customer’s address, while the 
contracting institution will be using its nearest to the customer branch in order to carry 
out a face-to-face identification. 
Additionally, according to Article 3(2) of the EC Directive, identification is 
required “for any transaction (…) involving a sum amounting to 15.000 Euro or more, 
whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations 
which seem to be linked”. For the case of on-line transactions this could be partly 
supported by appropriate software, which would monitor the amounts and frequency 
of transactions and then produce a suspicions report. But, no regulation imposes such 
application yet. 
Greece is at the moment the only EU member in the region and has fully50 
implemented the Directive. Furthermore, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovenia and Turkey are associated members and lately Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, F.Y.R. of Macedonia and Yugoslavia have participated to one 
more meeting preparing the ground for their EU candidature.51 It is then, important to 
realize that the high degree of regulation in the EU context, makes more imperative 
the need for compliance of all South East European jurisdictions with the FATF 
recommendations. 
Article 9.3 of the EC Directive on electronic commerce, relating to the 
treatment of electronic contracts, issues an alternative way for Member States to 
amend their money laundering policy as far as information society services are 
                                                
48 Concerning the extension of Article 6 (of 91/308/EEC Directive, n 5 above) to persons and 
professions other than the financial institutions currently mentioned in the Directive, which are at risk 
of being involved in money laundering or abused by money launderers, European Commission, [Doc. 
599PC0352], n 47 above. 
49 European Commission, [Doc. 599PC0352], n 47 above, Annex. 
50 DG Internal Market, “Money laundering: How to improve EU rules for prevention”, Europa web 
site, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/index.htm>. 
51 Referring to a meeting of November 2000, Kerin H. (Ed.), January 2001, Business File Newsletter – 
Greek Special Survey Series, Economic and Industrial Review, No 8. 
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concerned. “Member States shall indicate to the Commission the categories [of 
electronic contracts] to which they do not apply [Art. 9] Paragraph 1”52. The first 
paragraph of the article sets that the Member States “shall ensure that their legal 
system allows contracts to be concluded by electronic means”. Most importantly, EU 
Member States shall submit to the Commission every five years a relative report.53 
Moreover, it is interesting to consider the consequences of gambling 
(including lotteries and betting transactions) being excluded54 from the scope of the e-
commerce Directive.55  
 
4 d. Other bodies 
4 d (i). The European State Lottery Association (ESTLA): 
Although a union movement cannot be of the same importance as 
supranational or intergovernmental efforts against fraud, the role of ESTLA can 
acquire particular significance for the purposes of the subject under analysis. Firstly, 
the State Lotteries of all thirteen countries56 of South Eastern Europe are members of 
the ESTLA, even the State Lotteries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and F.R. of Yugoslavia 
that do not participate to any other of the bodies presented above. 
State lotteries, being monopolies in most of the states involved, are trying to 
prevent cross border providing of lottery and wagering services, which is the main 
advantage for on-line gaming businesses to count on. The threat is described as “free 
lottery sites, which are developing into a thriving commerce”57, the means could be 
among others the under development EC legislation, and the reason to combat such 
economic activity is “the danger of lost tax revenue [for states] and the problem of 
money laundering” 58. 
 
                                                
52 The report can only specify categories within the framework of paragraph 2 of the same article. 
53 Article 9, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [17-7-2000, L 178/1]. 
54 Since in most of the EU countries state lotteries are monopolies ensuring big percentages of state 
revenues, if the gambling industry was to be included, it is more than certain that the e-commerce 
Directive would still be under discussion. 
55 Article 1.5 (d), Directive 2000/31/EC, n 53 above. 
56 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, F.Y.R. of Macedonia, 
Moldavia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, F.R. of Yugoslavia. 
57 ESTLA, New Media and Internet working group, Meeting on 25-9-2000, Paris, France. 
58 ESTLA, 2000, n 57 above. 
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4 d (ii). The Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE): 
Additionally, the FESE membership covers 21 stock exchanges59, within 
which are the Athens Stock Exchange as a full member and the Budapest Stock 
Exchange, Ljubljana Stock Exchange, Cyprus Stock Exchange as associate members. 
The FESE exchanges have already concluded a Memorandum of Understanding, 
which specifically applies for the cross-border exchange of information, while the 
FESCO (Forum of European Securities Commissions) has also set up similar 
exchange of information mechanisms. The Secretary-General of the FESE, invited for 
the first time to a FATF Forum, refering “to the section of the FATF typologies report 
on on-line banking, (…) stressed the fact that all the European markets are fully 
electronic and the impact of this on the audit trail”60. 
 
 
5. South Eastern Europe: An alternative? 
 
“Money has to circulate. Money has no origin. Money might be dirty but it 
doesn’t stink.”61 To be more descriptive, transactions cannot be a crime by themselves 
and even when the criminal activity behind them is proved, funds of the size of 
criminal proceeds can be useful for an economy. Beyond any doubt and also 
recognized by the FATF, it is true that weak economies cannot afford to be too 
selective about the funds they attract, without being legalized for doing so. Yet 
“laundered money flows into global financial systems where it can undermine 
national economies and currencies [, turning money laundering] not only [to] a law 
enforcement problem but [to] a serious national and international security threat as 
well”62. Consequently, lack of political will to fight against money laundering can be 
viewed as a solution or a danger. To repeat the words of the owner of a company that 
provides regulatory arbitrage63 by taking advantage of the Internet technology “(…) in 
any case, OECD member nations have limited incentive to financially isolate tax 
                                                
59 FESE, January 2001, “Second Report and Recommendations on European Regulatory Structures”, < 
http://www.fese.be>. 
60 FATF/OECD, 2-6-2000, Annual Report 1999-2000. 
61 Comment expressed by an expert of the Greek banking system to the author. 
62 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “INCSR 
- Money Laundering and Financial Crimes”, March 1999, p.2. 
63 Regulatory arbitrage refers to “[a] financial contract or a series of transactions undertaken, entirely or 
in part, because the transaction(s) enable(s) one or both of the counter parties to accomplish a financial 
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havens. Big countries may need these small nations’ cooperation in fighting global 
threats such as terrorism bio-warfare or computer viruses. The price of cooperation 
may well be a willingness to look the other way regarding a few margarita-drinking 
tax cheats.”64 
 
5 a. Current situation 
 
This paper aims to analyze the impact of new technologies on money 
laundering activities, deriving from, passing through or using the regimes of SE 
European countries. As the majority of the countries concerned are experiencing a 
transitional period facing major economic problems, it seems strange or rather 
impossible that new technologies can be sufficiently supported for money launderers 
to act. We thus have to accept an uncontestable truth: crime always has access to 
latest technology first, way before governments or even private sector have. 
Another acknowledgement needing to be made is that on-line services not 
more than money-laundering activity is a global phenomenon. Cyber laundering is, 
therefore, a highly transnational activity, giving to FATF’s Recommendation 3 
exhortation for “increased multilateral co-operation and mutual legal assistance”65, a 
more and more imperative character. After all, according to an expert of the Greek 
banking system, there is no need for a whole country to be familiarized with 
information and communication technologies; “ten persons are absolutely sufficient” 
for money laundering market to flourish; and it would be a mistake to suppose that 
each of the Balkan states does not host “ten experts”. Taking into account the 
presence of languages in the online community from the countries under 
consideration Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey are the more 
Internet active 66. 
                                                                                                                                       
or operating objective which is unavailable to them directly because of regulatory obstacles.”, 
International Financial Risk Institute (IFCI) <http://risk.ifci.ch> 
64 Taggart, St., n 22 above, p.76-77. 
65 “An effective money laundering enforcement program should include increased multilateral co-
operation and mutual legal assistance in money laundering investigations and prosecutions and 
extradition in money laundering cases, where possible”, Recommendation 3, n 21 above. 
66 Greek speaking online population is 1.5 million, Hungarian is 0.8 m., Romanian 0.6 m., Slovenian 
0.46 m., Turkish 2.2 m. Indicatively, and taking as a fact that the populations’ presence indicates the 
majority of web sites in the same language, the Russian speaking community is 9.3 m. and the English 
192.1 consisting with no doubt of users throughout the world. Global Internet Statistics / by Language, 
December 2000, <http://www.glreach.com>. 
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Furthermore, a useful observation would be the following: Greece is 
apparently the most regulated jurisdiction in the region (meeting most of the FATF 
forty recommendations and having implemented the EC Directive) and “[t]he Greek 
anti-money laundering system (…) appears to be working reasonably well in several 
areas” and still “the results achieved so far, though moving in the right direction, are 
modest”67. Additionally, Turkey “[s]ince the first evaluation has taken significant 
steps towards meeting the forty Recommendations and working to implement an 
effective anti-money laundering system. (…) [but] the results in the first year have 
been moderate”68. It is significant to notice that Turkey does not currently meet FATF 
Recommendations 19 and 20, concerning anti-money laundering programs that should 
be developed by financial institutions69 and application of principles governing 
financial institutions to their branches located abroad70. On the contrary, membership 
to international bodies does not ensure legal action. “The prevention and Suppression 
of Money Laundering Activities Law 1996” of Cyprus “(…) provides a very 
comprehensive legal framework which compares favourably with others in place in 
larger countries which are members of the FATF”; the PC-R-EV Committee 
continues mentioning that “[i]ts impressive legal structure, based on existing 
international anti-money laundering standards, is significantly in advance of any other 
country in its geographic sub-region”.71 
The rest countries of the region being non-FATF members, as well, are not 
typically obliged to impose such policies. Despite the many differences existing in the 
financial systems’ structures of the countries concerned, according to the PC-R-EV 
Committee reports, the economies of Croatia, Hungary, F.Y.R. of Macedonia and 
Slovenia are still heavily cash based72, a factor indicating money laundering 
possibilities.73  To be more specific, “[w]hile [the Romanian law] provides for some 
sanctions to be taken by the office for non-compliance, no authority or institution is 
                                                
67 FATF/OECD, 2000, Report for Greece. 
68 FATF/OECD, 2000, Report for Turkey. 
69 Recommendation 19, n 21 above. 
70 Recommendation 20, n 21 above. 
71 PC-R-EV Committee, Report for Cyprus to be included in the 1999-2000 Annual Report, Council of 
Europe. 
72 PC-R-EV Committee, Reports for Croatia, Hungary, F.Y.R. of Macedonia and Slovenia to be 
included in the 1999-2000 Annual Report, Council of Europe. 
73 For the purposes of the subject under analysis a cash based economy implies the existence of 
launderers and criminal activity rather than the facilitation of cyber laundering. 
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tasked explicitly with checking compliance with [the law]”74. With no doubt the 
international community invites all countries to continuously monitor their anti-
money laundering system as well as to implement the necessary changes to make their 
system more effective. Still, it is obvious that launderers using new on-line 
technologies cannot be effectively controlled, when not even conventional criminal 
activity is being traced; and cyber laundering has a brilliant opportunity to flourish as 
web services develop with unusually high speeds and low costs. 
 
5 b. An alternative for cyber launderers – possible infringements  
 
In relation with dealing cyber laundering problems, FATF experts offer to 
states suggestions75 such as: customer identification reinforcement; development of 
new information technology capabilities for “detection of suspicious on-line 
transactions and verification of the customer”; prohibition of financial institutions not 
licensed in a jurisdiction from offering their services in that jurisdiction on-line, 
which is consistent with offering on-line services only to accounts that have been 
opened with face-to-face identification76. Yet, it has to be recognized that due to 
universal competition the web presence of a legally formed financial institution – or 
any other business - is subject to, it is unfair from the part of national authorities to 
impose measures restricting the types or quality of services permitted77. 
Finally, the most difficult part is that of the suggestion for “oversight of 
both”78, the jurisdiction where an on-line banking service is offered from and the one 
where the clients are using the service. Southeastern Europe is characterized by this 
difficulty due to the different international obligations the countries of the region are 
subject to. To bring an example, supposing that Greek banks in the near future will 
comply with measures similar to those described above79; on the first hand they will 
                                                
74 Refering to Law No 21/99, PC-R-EV Committee, Report for Romania to be included in the 1999-
2000 Annual Report, Council of Europe. 
75 FATF-XI, 2000, n 14 above, p.4. 
76 The above measure is also considered in the framework of an ANNEX to be included to the EC anti-
money laundering Directive, which is currently under amendment [Directive 91/308/EEC, n 5 above]. 
View below, 4 c. EU members. 
77 One of the suggestions refers to limiting “the types of permitted on-line services ore the amount of 
such transactions”, while avoidance of creating anonymous accounts, is with no doubt a disincentive 
for the Internet customer, who may well prefer other on-line services. (FATF-XI, 2000, n 14 above, 
p.4.) 
78 FATF-XI, 2000, n 14 above, p.4. 
79 As a consequence of legislative changes deriving from both its FATF and EU memberships. 
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possibly be unable to identify their Bulgarian client who manages his on-line account 
from Bulgaria and who has given the identification information of a relative legally 
residing in Greece; and on the second they cannot expect from Bulgarian authorities - 
trying to conform their current anti-money laundering policy to international 
standards - to monitor through ISPs every Internet connection in order to trace such 
activity. Therefore, it is not the use of information society services, the act of 
transmitting electronically content, that will lead to the criminal. 
A similar situation and absolutely unregulated is the case of an on-line 
casino80 managed remotely through Romania, physically being hosted in Turkey, 
typically owned by an offshore company incorporated in Cyprus, where the Greek 
players residing in Greece and having given false personal data but an existing 
address possibly in Greece - since the casino’s registration form does not impose such 
restrictions - cannot be traced separately by Greek authorities and certainly not by 
Cypriot81 or Romanian or Turkish. 
Supposing that criminal activity has been found with the collaboration of the 
involved states’ authorities and that Turkey and Cyprus are EU members and have 
implemented the acquis communautaire, the Turkish hosting provider would be liable 
in case it was provable that there was “actual knowledge of illegal activity”82 being 
offered through its servers, while the company incorporated in Cyprus, owned by a 
resident of Romania would probably face sanctions set by EU and Cypriot 
legislation.83 It is most possible though that none of the collaborating corporations 
will have evidence for the identity of the person(s) managing remotely the on-line 
service. 
 
 
 
                                                
80 This is not to imply that all on-line gaming services or all offshore incorporated web businesses are 
suspicious for money laundering activities, the main reason for using offshore locations being to offer 
free VAT services. The offshore jurisdiction not imposing any restrictions, the jurisdiction where the 
client accesses the service from is not able to monitor him or her. 
81 As long as the bookkeeping obligations of the company do not raise suspicions. 
82 Article 14, Directive 2000/31/EC, n 53 above. 
83 The example is totally hypothetical and the possible legal consequences presented aim only to 
demonstrate that although legislative measures can be such as to bring effect, their enforcement is 
subject to the collaboration between state authorities, the full implementation of obligations deriving 
from international agreements and the development of methods for tracing cyber crime. One would 
argue, if this would happen, cyber launderers would find alternative jurisdictions to host illegal 
electronic content or create offshore companies and maintain management or access services remotely. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Conclusively, the countries of South-Eastern Europe in general do consist an 
alternative for money laundering activities, as they currently do not have strict anti-
money laundering policies. Provided that they comply with international efforts at 
some point, combined with their future accession to the European Union the problem 
would seem to have been resolved. Still, the means of information society imply that 
money laundering will become more uncontrollable than ever, not only in the region 
but also worldwide. Adoption in the first place and implementation in the second of 
legislative provisions is unable to follow the pace of technological advances84. 
Relatively, it is indicative that the FATF experts group mention in late 1999, when the 
Internet certainly wasn’t new to the international community that “there [is still] a 
need within the law enforcement community to develop expertise in the detection and 
investigation of potential money laundering in the Internet environment”85. 
The states cannot reduce or abstain from offering technologically advanced 
services or benefits to their citizens. The opposite would mean to choose not to 
digitalize a respectable amount of information and services important for the 
operation of the state itself or the economy in order to avoid criminal activity. On the 
other hand, “with electronic cash, investigators will have to (…) look at the 
[encrypted] packets themselves to determine if a money transfer is taking place”. 
Consequently, transnational coordination in such a level would represent “a whole 
new order of intrusive supervision of global communications”.86 
In any event, the Internet users are the ones to make the first step, for their 
own benefit and in order to make the scene clearer for authorities to act. On this 
regard, efforts are being made to warn consumers not to trust web service providers 
that do not clearly present information about their company. Article 5 of the EC e-
commerce Directive requires that this kind of information is rendered by the service 
provider “easily, directly and permanently accessible to the recipients of the service 
and competent authorities”87. The ESTLA considers establishing a certificate to be 
used by the web sites of its members that would guarantee the quality of the service 
                                                
84 Snaith I., n 13 above, p. 12. 
85 FATF-XI, 2000, n 14 above, p.4. 
86 Taggart, St., n 22 above, p.76. 
87 Directive 2000/31/EC, n 53 above. 
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provided.88 Furthermore, numerous web sites constitute “black lists” of gambling or 
commercial web sites that are to be avoided by users.89 
                                                
88 ESTLA, 8-2-2000, Draft Code of Conduct the use of Information Society services for the distribution 
of gambling services. 
89 Tovas, C-W, 31-01-2001, “History repeats itself”, Gambler’s Domain, <http://www.gamblers 
domain.com>. 
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ANNEX  
 
Participation of South-East European Countries in collective anti- money 
laundering efforts 
 
 
PC-R-EV 
Committee 
EU EU Other 
bodies 
Other 
bodies 
Country OECD FATF 
(Member / 
Observer) 
(Member) (Candidate / 
Associated) 
(ESTLA) (FESE) 
ALBANIA     !"     !" "
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA           !" "
BULGARIA     !"   !" !" "
CROATIA     !"     !" "
CYPRUS     !"   !" !" !"
GREECE !" !" !" !"   !" !"
HYNGARY !"   !"   !" !" !"
F.Y.R. OF MACEDONIA     !"     !" "
MOLDOVA     !"     !" "
ROMANIA     !"   !" !" "
SLOVENIA     !"   !" !" !"
TURKEY !" !" !"   !" !" "
F.R. OF YUGOSLAVIA           !" "
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